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New Zealand's political landscape experienced a seismic shift in 1993, when the 
country replaced the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) voting system it had inherited from its 
British colonial past with a new Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. 
The move had immediate and deep ramifications for a whole range of issues: the range 
of interests represented in Parliament;1 the way that governments are formed and 
function;2 how the country's public sector agencies operate;3 the manner in which its 
electoral participants conduct their campaigns;4 and so on. Indeed, it is not too much of 
an exaggeration to say that every area of New Zealand's public and political life was 
touched in some fashion by the general 'systems change' produced by the country's 
decision to embrace MMP.5 These changes have effected shifts in what may be termed 
the 'political culture' of New Zealand; re-alignments in the relationships between 
various public and political institutions and bodies; as well as alterations to the formal 
legal rules that govern these institutions and bodies. Any sort of full and 
comprehensive consideration of the extent and nature of these various changes would 
require a book-length study, if not a multi-volume work.  
Therefore, the present article has relatively modest ambitions.6 With almost a 
decade's worth of experience of 'MMP-in-practice' to reflect upon, we trace how this 
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change to New Zealand's voting system has impacted upon three particular themes 
running through New Zealand's wider electoral laws and practices. These themes are: 
• ideals about, and institutions for, representation of the voters' will; 
• changes in the constitutional balance of power; and 
• continuing efforts to engage the voting population in the electoral process in 
general. 
We believe these themes are pertinent as they encapsulate the 10 criteria identified 
by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in its 1986 report as being relevant to 
any decision over which voting system would provide the greatest benefits for New 
Zealand.7 Following the application of these criteria, the Royal Commission concluded 
that MMP could best fill this role. In turn, this body's recommendations proved pivotal 
in New Zealand's decision to adopt MMP. Making use of these three themes as a prism 
through which to view the present state of the country's electoral law can thus enable 
us to explore the extent to which the promised advantages of MMP have been borne 
out in the actual, concrete, development of New Zealand's electoral laws and practices.  
That being said, we are aware that any attempt to analyse the impact of MMP upon 
New Zealand's broader electoral laws and practices must take account of the fact that 
no simple, one-way, causal relationship exists in this area. It is true that, in the final 
analysis, the adoption of MMP constituted a judgement by the majority of New 
Zealand's voters that it supplies a 'better' means of measuring the preferences of the 
public at election time. Therefore, it can be said that by 1993 the MMP voting system 
had come to be viewed as providing a superior means of expressing the self-reflected 
political identity of (at least a majority of) the New Zealand public.8 However, the legal 
rules which a country adopts to govern its electoral processes, including the rules it 
puts in place to determine its voting procedures, will in turn impact upon the political 
experiences (and thus political identity) of the citizens of that country.9 There will thus 
be something of a feedback loop at work in this area: a society's judgement as to what 
constitutes a 'good' (or 'better') electoral system will, in part, come from that society's 
previous experience of democracy at work; even as the rules that determine how a 
country's elections are to take place will stem from its ideals about democracy as a 
method of collectively deciding how, and by whom, that society will be governed. 
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Therefore, exploring how New Zealand's change to MMP has impacted upon the 
three themes identified above is not a simple matter of mapping the present contours 
of New Zealand's electoral laws and processes on to an ideal blueprint laid out at some 
point in the past, and then assessing where these real-world practices match, or fail to 
correspond to, that exemplary model. What is instead required is some understanding 
of how the system of electoral laws and processes has developed over time; how the 
ideals it is expected to serve may have altered during that time; and how the 
experience of changing the voting system might resolve some issues previously seen as 
problematic, while simultaneously raising new challenges to be resolved.  
With these caveats in place, we begin our account with a brief overview that locates 
New Zealand's MMP voting system in the wider context of the country's process of 
government. We then give a description of the reasons why, and process by which, 
MMP came to be adopted in place of the FPTP voting system. The various ways in 
which the adoption of this new voting system has impacted upon the three themes we 
have outlined above are then considered. 
I MMP IN CONTEXT 
A brief background to New Zealand's system of government and present voting 
system may be in order for those not fully au fait with these particular aspects of its 
society. New Zealand is a unitary state which continues to acknowledge the United 
Kingdom's Sovereign — in her guise as Queen of New Zealand — as its head of state,10 
with a Governor-General representing the monarch in situ. It has a parliamentary 
system of government based on the Westminster system, with a unicameral legislature 
(the House of Representatives) that usually consists of 120 members. A general election 
for the House of Representatives must be held every three years,11 but may be called 
earlier if the government so chooses. Following public endorsement in a referendum in 
1993, and beginning with the 1996 general election, the MMP voting system is used to 
elect members of Parliament ('MPs').12  
MMP is a form of proportional representation in which each voter casts two votes: a 
'Party Vote' directly for his or her preferred political party; and an 'Electorate Vote' for 
the preferred candidate in the voter's local constituency, or electorate. Each of the 
country's 69 electorates — consisting of 62 general seats, and 7 Maori seats reserved for 
those voters of Maori descent who choose to enrol on the Maori roll — then return to 
Parliament the candidate who has obtained the greatest number of Electorate Votes. 
Additional 'list seats' are then apportioned amongst those political parties which cross 
a representation 'threshold' — winning either 5 percent of the Party Vote, or at least 
one electorate seat — in order to bring each qualifying party's total number of seats 
into line with its share of the overall Party Vote, as determined by the Sainte-Laguë 
formula.13 These additional list seats are filled from a ranked list of candidates drawn 
up by each political party prior to the election being held. Therefore, the most 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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important feature of this method of voting is that any political party which meets the 
representation threshold at an election will gain an allocation of the seats in Parliament 
that very closely matches its overall level of support amongst the community as a 
whole, as indicated by its share of the Party Vote. 
II NEW ZEALAND'S ADOPTION OF MMP 
MMP was introduced into New Zealand as the consequence of a simple majority vote 
in a referendum held alongside the 1993 general election.14 The full reasons behind the 
majority's decision to choose the novelty of proportional representation in place of the 
constituency-based, FPTP system used since New Zealand's first national, 
representative elections in 185315 are understandably complex, and detailed accounts 
of the voters' motivations have been given elsewhere.16 That being said, and despite 
the risk of over-simplifying matters, the vote for change reflected a widespread feeling 
that the existing FPTP system was failing to give the voters adequate control over New 
Zealand's governing institutions.17 The source of this zeitgeist can in turn be found in 
New Zealand's then-recent political history. A set of neo-liberal economic policies, 
combined with a rather rapid series of changes to New Zealand's social fabric, were 
instituted first by the Fourth Labour Government (1984–90), and then continued under 
a National Government (1990–93). Many of these policies were adopted without 
previously being flagged in the election manifestos of those political parties, or even 
after having been expressly disavowed at election time. This experience resulted in 
deep and widespread disillusionment with the political parties and their individual 
representatives.18 Of course, the phenomenon of declining trust in political leaders and 
institutions was hardly peculiar to the New Zealand context. It was — and remains — 
something of a generic problem across the Western world,19 and so cannot by itself 
explain New Zealand's particular decision to switch electoral systems. However, what 
was perhaps different about New Zealand's experience was that the electorate's 
condemnation of these forms of political behaviour spread beyond the individual 
politicians involved to encompass the voting system that had been used to elect them 
to power.  
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14  Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 2(1).  
15  With the exception of the 1908 and 1911 elections, when a 'second ballot' voting system was 
used. 
16  Jack Vowles et al, Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to 
Proportional Representation (1995). See also the sources cited in the following two footnotes. 
17  Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie, New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation: Accident? 
Design? Evolution? (1998) 315–7; James Lamare and Jack Vowles, 'Party Interests, Public 
Opinion and Institutional Preferences: Electoral System Change in New Zealand' (1996) 31 
Australian Journal of Political Science 321, 336–7. 
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University of Wellington Law Review 719; Tim Bale and Nigel Roberts, 'Plus ça change …? 
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2004 Causes and Consequences of NZ's Adoption of MMP 5 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
The aspect of the existing FPTP system that came under most intense scrutiny was 
its tendency to bestow inflated levels of representation upon large, established political 
parties, and to 'under reward' smaller parties for the support they had gained.20 So 
long as the Labour and National parties — New Zealand's two dominant political 
entities during the post-war period — were viewed as presenting the voters with clear 
alternatives at the ballot box, this outcome of the FPTP voting process did not pose a 
particular threat to its perceived legitimacy.21 However, as a result of the broadly 
matching economic and social reforms pursued by both parties in the 1980s and 1990s, 
a large proportion of the voting public came to see Labour and National as basically 
interchangeable in terms of their policies and behaviour. At New Zealand's 1993 
general election — the last to be held under FPTP — this disillusionment resulted in 
almost 1 in 3 voters choosing to leave the 'big tents' pitched by the Labour and 
National parties, and instead deliver their vote to some minor party. However, the 
casting of such 'protest' votes proved ineffective as a means punishing these two 
parties. Because candidates from the Labour or National parties still captured a 
plurality of the vote in the vast majority of constituencies, the FPTP voting system 
meant that these parties still retained virtually all of the seats in Parliament. Therefore, 
in spite of winning over 30 percent of the vote nationwide in 1993, candidates from the 
various minor parties still were elected to only 4 of the 99 seats in Parliament.22 
Representatives from National and Labour were then returned in the other 95, with the 
50 seats won by the National Party again allowing it to form a single-party majority 
government.  
A But why MMP? 
Against this historical background, the vote in favour of MMP is usually portrayed in 
the negative — as a rebellion by the voters against the political practices of the 
previous decade.23 And it is certainly true that an aversion towards the concrete 
consequences of the existing FPTP voting process plays a particularly important part in 
the story of the introduction of MMP into New Zealand. Nevertheless, dislike of the 
outcomes produced by FPTP, and a desire to abandon it as a method of electing 
representatives into the Parliament, need not necessarily have led the majority of voters 
to choose to replace it with MMP. There were, after all, a variety of other voting 
systems available to be chosen from once the public had decided to move away from 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
20  Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (1951) 
217. This effect was particularly pronounced in New Zealand; see Helena Catt, Paul Harris 
and Nigel Roberts, Voter's Choice: Electoral Change in New Zealand? (1992) 80–81. 
21  Boston et al, above n 3, 3. That being said, the fact that the FPTP system did not reward 
even the major parties in a consistent fashion was a cause for some disquiet. For example, 
in both the 1978 and 1981 general elections the National Party was able to win a majority of 
seats in Parliament despite receiving fewer total votes than did the Labour Party. 
22  The Alliance Party gained 18.2% of the total votes cast, but only 2 seats in Parliament. The 
NZ First Party also gained 2 seats, along with 8.4% of the nationwide vote. 
23  Jackson and McRobie, above n 17, 257–63; Jack Vowles et al, 'Public Opinion, Public 
Knowledge, and the Electoral System' in Jack Vowles et al (eds), Proportional Representation 
on Trial (2002) 160. However, a detailed study of the voters' motivations in the 1993 
referendum has concluded that 'the vast majority of voters appeared to have good reasons 
for making their choice'; see Vowles et al, above n 16, 192. 
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the one currently in place.24 Therefore, while voter disenchantment with the political 
status quo might account for why the majority of voters in New Zealand chose to turn 
their backs on the existing FPTP voting system, further explanation is required to 
clarify why they then viewed MMP as being the most desirable alternative electoral 
regime.  
The particular decision to adopt MMP ahead of any other alternative to FPTP can 
be traced back to a report issued in 1986 by the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System.25 Established in 1985 by a consciously reform-minded Minister of Justice, Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer, this five-member, non-partisan body was given a broad brief to 
examine New Zealand's existing electoral system, and recommend what changes 
ought to be made to it. The central (and unexpected) recommendation contained in the 
resulting 302 page report was that the FPTP voting system ought to be replaced with 
the MMP electoral process, based upon the (then) West German model.26 The 
Commission justified its conclusion on the basis that FPTP displayed 'severe 
weaknesses' in relation to fairness to major and minor parties, minority representation 
and Maori representation.27 Of the alternatives to FPTP then considered by the 
Commission,28 MMP was regarded as providing the most suitable replacement as it 
would be fairer to all the political parties and would lead to greater voter participation, 
improved representation of Maori and other groups, and therefore would be seen as 
having greater legitimacy by the voting public.29 What is more, the Commission 
claimed that MMP could deliver 'comparable, though sometimes different' advantages 
to FPTP in relation to effective government, effective Parliament, representation of 
constituents, effective parties, and political integration. 
Although initially ignored by the government which had commissioned it, this 
report ultimately proved crucial in New Zealand's move to MMP. Admittedly, most 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
24  The referendums leading to the introduction of MMP actually took place in two stages. The 
first stage, a stand alone referendum which occurred in 1992, asked voters two questions. 
First of all, they were asked whether they wanted to retain the existing FPTP system, or 
whether they wanted to change it. They were then asked which of four voting systems they 
would prefer to the existing FPTP system. These four systems were: Supplementary 
Member; Single Transferable Vote; Mixed-Member Proportional; and Preferential Voting. 
For an account of how these voting systems work see Administration and Cost of Elections 
Project, Electoral Systems Index <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/es.htm> 
(visited 13 August, 2003). This first stage resulted in a turnout of 55.2% of registered voters, 
with 84.7% voting in favour of changing away from FPTP, and 70.5% of these voters then 
favouring MMP ahead of the other three alternative voting systems. See generally Jackson 
and McRobie, above n 17, 237–42. The second referendum, held on election night in 1993, 
then gave voters a straight choice between FPTP and MMP. This resulted in a 46% vote for 
FPTP, and a 54% vote for MMP, with an 85.2% turnout. 
25  RCES, above n 7.  
26  One of the reasons the Commission preferred MMP was the overall good impression it 
gained of West Germany's experience with using the voting system. See Jackson and 
McRobie, above n 17, 118–9.  
27  RCES, above n 7, 28.  
28  The four alternative voting systems considered in detail by the Commission were the 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) system; the Preferential Vote system used to elect the 
Australian House of Representatives; the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system; and 
the Supplementary Member (SM) system. 
29  RCES, above n 7, 85. 
2004 Causes and Consequences of NZ's Adoption of MMP 7 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
voters did not trawl through the volume to discover for themselves the particular 
reasons underpinning the Commission's conclusions. Nevertheless, the fact that such a 
worthy body considered MMP to be the best available electoral process helped boost 
MMP's credibility as a practical alternative to FPTP. As the 1980s passed, and the 
previously described disillusionment with electoral 'politics-as-usual' spread, the 
conditions became ripe for electoral reform. Groups pushing for such change were 
then able to draw upon the Commission's conclusions to buttress their arguments, and 
point to its recommendations as providing a superior alternative to the status quo. The 
upshot was that by the time the 1993 referendum was held, a majority of the voters had 
become sufficiently convinced of the correctness of the Commission's judgment to cast 
their votes in favour of adopting MMP.  
B Themes emerging from the introduction of MMP 
Three broad themes emerge from this all-too-brief summary of the background to the 
introduction of MMP into New Zealand.30 The first is that of representation, and the 
expectation that MMP could do a 'better' job than the existing FPTP voting system of 
converting the expressed preferences of the voters into members sitting in the 
country's Parliament.31 Under MMP, the focus of representation would shift from the 
individual candidate running in a particular constituency, to the national political 
parties competing for a share of the overall Party Vote. The strongly proportional 
nature of MMP would then avoid the distorting effects exhibited by FPTP in terms of 
its allocation of seats amongst the political parties, and would instead give each 
qualifying party an allotment of representation closely matching their support in the 
community at large (as demonstrated by their share of the Party Vote). Furthermore, 
by setting the 'threshold' for gaining representation in parliament at five percent of the 
party vote or one electorate seat, MMP would increase the opportunity for smaller and 
emergent political parties to enter into Parliament.32 These twin effects were expected 
to link representation in Parliament more closely to the preferences of the voters: both 
in terms of who was entitled to be represented (through broadening the range of 
parties that would be able to gain seats in Parliament); and the level of such 
representation (through closely tying the number of MPs from each party to the 
number of votes cast for that party). 
The second theme in the adoption of MMP relates to the diffusion of executive 
power. Because MMP would most likely require some coalition arrangement between 
two or more parties in order to gain governmental power, rather than deliver a single-
party majority government, it was expected to check the ability of any one party to 
unilaterally impose its particular policy agenda upon the country. This consequence 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
30  A further theme, which cannot be fully recounted here due to space constraints, is that of 
blind chance. The decision to hold a referendum on the future of the electoral process can 
be partly ascribed to a televised election debate held prior to the 1987 general election, in 
which the then Labour Prime Minister misread his briefing notes and accidentally 
committed his party to put the matter to a public vote. This commitment then led the 
National Party to make a similar promise — one it then felt unable to resile from when it 
came to power in 1990. See Jackson and McRobie, above n 17, ch 7. 
31  RCES, above n 7, 50–1, 63. 
32  The Royal Commission actually recommended the threshold be set at 4 per cent, and 
suggested that this could be waived altogether for parties representing Maori interests if 
the Maori electoral seats were abolished. See ibid.  
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was considered especially important in light of the history of executive dominance of 
the New Zealand Parliament stemming from the cabinet system of government, 
combined with strong party discipline and an absence of any real constitutional 
restraints upon Parliament's power to act. With no upper house in the New Zealand 
legislature, no substantive review of legislative action by the courts, and no means of 
direct voter override of parliamentary action, a governing party — one with majority 
support in the House of Representatives — faces no formal constitutional checks as to 
how it might exercise law-making power. Requiring political parties to work together 
in order to govern was seen to be a way of counteracting the ability of a governing 
party to 'ram through' policy changes in the face of substantial public disquiet. 
A third and final theme in this story emerges from a distillation of the public mood 
accompanying the introduction of MMP: electoral disenchantment, along with 
promised redemption. The existing FPTP system was abandoned due to the general 
dissatisfaction of the majority of voters with the way that New Zealand's processes of 
government were operating. MMP was then 'sold' to the public as a corrective 
measure, on the grounds that it would 'be a significant structural change that is bound 
to improve our politics. It has the potential to alter for the better the behaviour of the 
political parties toward each other.'33  
With these three themes identified, this article proceeds to examine how they have 
further developed following the introduction of MMP. This examination in part 
involves measuring whether, and to what extent, the reality of New Zealand's political 
experiences has meshed with the anticipated consequences of moving to the new 
electoral system. However, it also requires a dynamic approach — a recognition that a 
change to one part of a country's system of electoral regulation will inevitably create 
new issues that could not be fully foreseen at the time the change was made. With this 
in mind, the following three sections seek to explain just how the change to MMP has 
both resolved and bred problems within each of the three broad themes just outlined. 
III THE EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION OF MMP ON ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT REPRESENTATION 
Prior to the introduction of MMP, the regulatory regime governing New Zealand's 
electoral processes formally treated the issue of representation as being primarily a 
local constituency matter, rather than a national issue. Therefore, under FPTP, the law 
recognised the individual candidate, rather than the political party he or she 
represented, as the central campaigner come election time. Spending limits, along with 
a requirement to disclose election expenditures, were thus imposed on the campaigns 
of individual candidates as long ago as 1895, but not on those run by the national 
political parties. And while individual candidates (eventually) were entitled to include 
their party affiliation on the ballot paper,34 the law placed no external restrictions on 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
33  Comments made by the head of the Electoral Reform Coalition in the public debate over 
MMP: Colin Clark, 'MMP Seen as the Best Reform Option' The Dominion (Wellington, New 
Zealand), 9 November 1992, A8. 
34  This right was granted in 1975 by the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 (NZ) s 33(1) 
(introducing a new s 87(2A) into the Electoral Act 1956 (NZ)), only then to be removed by 
s 31(1) of the Electoral Amendment Act 1980 (NZ). The Electoral Amendment Act 1990 (NZ), 
s 40(1) reinstated the right to list a candidate's party affiliation on the ballot paper. 
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how the parties were to select candidates,35 nor did it contain any requirement that a 
party register its existence or abide by any particular rules before it became entitled to 
endorse candidates. By contrast, the ability of individual candidates to access the ballot 
was subject to regulation, with a requirement that the candidate satisfy a nationality 
requirement,36 be nominated by two voters enrolled in the constituency being 
contested, and pay a deposit before he or she was entitled to stand in any particular 
seat.37  
New Zealand's colonial pedigree provides one reason for this pre-MMP regulatory 
focus on the individual candidate — in particular, 'the rather quaint Victorian concept 
of the [British] House of Commons as 'geographical representation of the Kingdom' 
and 'congress of constituencies'.38 One contemporary commentary went so far as to 
claim that New Zealand's electoral process took this Westminster ideal even further 
than did the United Kingdom, being 'in some ways more British than Britain.'39 
However, the regulatory regime's emphasis on the individual candidate also drew on 
Burkean notions about the proper role that an elected representative should play; that 
of an independent deliberator, who uses his or her reason and judgement to decide 
what is the best course for the nation as a whole.40 Because candidates were assumed 
to be competing to gain election in particular geographic 'communities of interest', but 
thereafter going to Parliament to further the interests of the nation as a whole, electoral 
regulation was intended to do no more than provide the minimal safeguards required 
to ensure that the candidate selected to represent each constituency really was the 
individual most preferred by the voters in that specific area.  
A Bringing the political parties out of the shadows 
A consequence of this ongoing, candidate-centred focus of the regulatory framework 
for elections was that, right up until the eve of the introduction of MMP, New 
Zealand's electoral laws accorded the political parties only a kind of quasi-existence. 
The Electoral Act 1956 (NZ) barely mentioned these organisations, and then only in 
passing references relating to membership of the body responsible for drawing the 
boundaries of electoral districts,41 the form the ballot was to take,42 or restrictions on 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
35  At the most, a Returning Officer was entitled to 'require' a candidate to 'produce evidence 
… of the candidate's eligibility' to claim accreditation with any party. See Electoral Act 1956 
(NZ), s 87A (as amended by the Electoral Amendment Act 1990 (NZ), s 40(1)). 
36  Electoral Act 1956 (NZ), s 25(1) (inserted by Electoral Amendment Act 1975 (NZ), s 9). On the 
changing law relating to citizenship qualifications see Caroline Morris, 'On Becoming (and 
Remaining) a Member of Parliament' [2004] Public Law 11. See also Andrew Geddis, 
'Membership of the House' [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 30. 
37  Electoral Act 1956 (NZ), ss 80–81. 
38  Gerald Hogan, 'Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: Three 
European Approaches to Political Campaign Regulation' (1992) 21 Capital University Law 
Review 501, 523 (citations omitted).  
39  Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of 
Electoral Systems (1989) 38. 
40  See Edmund Burke, 'Speech to the Electors of Bristol on Being Elected', in Iain Hampsher-
Monk (ed), The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke (1987) 108–11. 
41  Electoral Act 1956 (NZ), s 15(2)(b). 
42  See above nn 34–35. 
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what campaign material could be publicly displayed on election day.43 Therefore, even 
as late as 1993, a High Court judge was still able to state that 'for legal purposes, 
political parties are private bodies. They have no statutory or public duties.'44 Justice 
Fisher instead concluded that parties were no more than unincorporated associations 
of like-minded individuals, whose sole purpose was to supply aid to individual 
candidates come election time.45 The consequence of this analysis was that internal 
party matters were to be treated as a private law matter of contract between the party 
and its members, and the application of public law principles to political parties was 
regarded as inappropriate. Therefore, as far as the formal legal regulation of the 
electoral process was concerned, political parties as institutional actors largely were 
relegated to the subsidiary role of support organisations for the individual candidate, 
who remained the 'real' electoral contestant. 
However, as the twentieth century progressed, the basic assumptions underpinning 
this regulatory framework increasingly failed to match the reality of electoral politics 
under FPTP.46 As is the case in other Western democracies — with the possible 
exception of the USA — political parties as institutions quickly came to dominate New 
Zealand's electoral scene, with the large majority of voters casting their ballots on 
election day based on a candidate's party affiliation rather than his or her individual 
qualities. This centrality of party affiliation to representation in New Zealand under 
FPTP is demonstrated by the fact that no independent candidate was elected while 
bearing such a label after 1943, while for the latter half of the twentieth century, every 
movement attempting to gain representation in Parliament was organised into the 
form of a political party.47 What is more, the development of internal systems of party 
discipline meant that far from filling the role of an individual deliberator, MPs became 
in all but the rarest of cases servants of their party's policies. Therefore, rather than an 
election providing voters with an opportunity to choose the individual candidate best 
qualified to represent them as an individual, it really gave voters the opportunity to pass 
judgement on the past performance of, and promised future actions by, the various 
national political parties. This was a point given great emphasis by the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System:  
It is the political parties inside and outside Parliament that in reality present the 
electorate with a choice of Government. They provide the candidates and prepare the 
policies between which the voters choose. … [T]he principal purpose of elections is now 
in fact to enable the people to decide in accordance with the electoral law which of the 
competing political parties will provide the Government.48
The events of the 1980s and 1990s, as outlined in the previous section, laid bare this 
disjuncture between the assumptions underlying the legal regulation of the FPTP 
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43  Electoral Act 1956 (NZ), ss 127(1)(e); 127(2) (inserted by Electoral Amendment Act 1990 (NZ), s 
32). 
44  Peters v Collinge [1993] 2 NZLR 554, 575, per Fisher J. See also Margaret Wilson, 'Political 
Parties and Participation', in Alan Simpson (ed), The Constitutional Implications of MMP 
(1998) 169. 
45  Peters v Collinge [1993] 2 NZLR 554, 556. 
46  See generally Neill Atkinson, Adventures in Democracy: A History of the Vote in New Zealand 
(2003). 
47  Elizabeth McLeay (ed), New Zealand Politics and Social Patterns: Selected Works by Robert 
Chapman (1999) 324.  
48  RCES, above n 7, 6. 
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voting system, and the reality of its actual operation. During that period, increasing 
numbers of voters came to regard FPTP as failing to reflect in an adequate manner the 
choice they had made between the political parties at election time. In particular, the 
tendency of FPTP to magnify the share of representation given to Labour and National 
— and thereby diminish the share given to alternative, smaller parties — reduced the 
voters' capacity to punish a misbehaving government through switching their votes 
between parties. This outcome was, in the opinion of the Royal Commission, 'unfair' to 
the minor parties and their supporters.49 The Commission's recommended solution to 
this problem was to redress these inequalities in treatment by moving to a voting 
system which allocates representation to each party in close proportion to the number 
of votes it receives nationwide. Therefore, while MMP would retain an element of 
direct, local representation through the 69 electorate seats, the centrality of the Party 
Vote to determining the overall distribution of seats in Parliament would mean that the 
parties qua parties would become institutionalised as the central vehicles for 
representation.  
B The law comes to the party50
Therefore, once MMP was adopted in 1993, the intermediary role that political parties 
play in selecting individual MPs was deliberately brought to the forefront of New 
Zealand's electoral processes. This new recognition of the parties' representational role 
went hand-in-hand with changes to their legal status. Following the passage of the 
Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), any party intending to contest the Party Vote is required to 
register with a (newly created) Electoral Commission.51 In order to become (and 
remain) registered, a party must meet a number of administrative demands, such as 
supplying the name and address of its secretary and auditor,52 and a copy of the 
party's membership rules and candidate selection rules.53 Additionally, it must also 
meet the substantive requirement of demonstrating that it has at least 500 'current 
financial members' who are eligible to enrol as electors,54 as well as making a statutory 
declaration that it intends contesting future elections.55 These registration rules operate 
as gatekeeper provisions, designed to restrict the type of entity which may contest the 
all important Party Vote to those which have demonstrated the requisite 'seriousness' 
of purpose. Once registered, a political party is then required to abide by a number of 
further regulations governing its financial affairs. It must file an annual return of party 
donations listing the source and amount of all donations greater than $10,000 received 
in the previous year.56 The amount that a party may spend on 'election expenses' in 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
49  Ibid 14. 
50  With due acknowledgment to Graeme Orr, 'The Law Comes to the Party: The Continuing 
Juridification of Political Parties in Australia' (2000) 3 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 
41. 
51  Political parties which do not wish to contest the Party Vote are not required to register. 
52  Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 63(2). 
53  Ibid s 71B. 
54  Ibid s 66(1)(b).  
55  Ibid s 71A. 
56  Ibid ss 214F–214G. See generally Andrew Geddis, 'Hide behind the Targets, in Front of all 
the People we Serve: New Zealand Election Law and the Problem of "Faceless" Donations' 
(2001) 12 Public Law Review 51. 
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any election campaign is restricted.57 Following each general election, a registered 
party must file a declaration of all such election expenses incurred during its campaign 
with the Electoral Commission.58 The Court of Appeal has upheld the Electoral 
Commission's right to require that the political party disclose in some detail exactly 
what these expenses went towards, and who received them.59 Both a party's donation 
return and its election expenses return must be independently audited, and both 
returns are open to public inspection.  
Furthermore, the way in which a registered political party selects its candidates for 
each election has been made the subject of express regulation. A registered political 
party wishing to contest the Party Vote must provide a ranked list of candidates for the 
list seats,60 and in addition may 'bulk nominate' candidates for the electorate seats.61 
Section 71 of the Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) requires that all registered parties follow 
'democratic procedures' when selecting these candidates, namely: 
[To] ensure that provision is made for participation in the selection of candidates 
representing the party for election as members of Parliament by — 
(a) current financial members of the party who are or would be entitled to vote for 
those candidates at any election; or 
(b) delegates who have (whether directly or indirectly) in turn been elected or 
otherwise selected by current financial members of the party; or 
(c) a combination of the persons or classes of persons referred to in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this section. 
The content of this requirement is perhaps not that exacting in practice, and its precise 
meaning has yet to be elucidated by a court. That being said, it does provide a 
mechanism by which an aggrieved party member can challenge in court any decision 
by the party to refuse to endorse him or her as a candidate, or the placement he or she 
is given on the party list.62  
C Just whom do MPs represent? 
The point of the above analysis is this: the introduction of MMP made the direct vote 
for a political party as an institution the most important mechanism for determining 
the overall make-up of Parliament; and the formal regulatory oversight applied to the 
political parties has been strengthened in light of their new role. A driving force 
behind the adoption of this new method of selecting representatives was the desire to 
more closely align the voters' preferences with the actual allocation of seats in 
Parliament. In turn, this realignment was expected to restore the voters faith that their 
views were being fully represented in Parliament — the evidence for which we 
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57  Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s 214B. See generally Andrew Geddis, 'Regulating the funding of 
election campaigns in New Zealand: A critical overview' (2004) 10 Otago Law Review 
(forthcoming). 
58  Ibid s 214C. 
59  Electoral Commission v Tate [1999] 3 NZLR 174. 
60  Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 127. 
61  Ibid s 146B–146L. 
62  While such challenges have been threatened on a number of occasions, none have yet 
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v Everingham [1993] 1 Qd R 10; Clarke v Australian Labor Party (1999) 74 SASR 109. 
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consider in the last part of this article63 — and to increase the overall diversity of 
representation in Parliament — an outcome which MMP has somewhat 
accomplished.64 However, MMP also altered the basic assumption underlying 
representation from that of the individual being (in the final analysis) responsible to 
their constituencies, to the MPs as servants of their political party. This shift in 
representative ideals post-MMP has been underscored by a couple of further changes.  
The first is largely symbolic: due to changes to Parliament's Standing Orders, votes 
in the House of Representatives are now taken on a party basis, rather than via 
individual MPs trooping into the lobbies of Parliament.65 An individual MP may still 
abstain or vote against his or her party — although some risk is incurred by this choice, 
as shall be explained in the next paragraph. However, if an MP does not wish to 
deviate from the party line, the actual power to cast his or her vote as a representative 
wholly lies in the hands of their party leader. The practical effect of this was seen 
during the present parliamentary term when an Association of Consumers and 
Taxpayers (ACT) Party MP ⎯ Donna Awatere Huata ⎯ was suspended from her 
party caucus, which thereafter refused to include that MP's vote in the party's total 
tally.66  
The second change has had more far-reaching consequences. Following a bout of 
'party hopping' that began in the 1993–6 parliamentary term as political actors 
prepared for the introduction of MMP, and which continued through the first MMP 
parliament with a further nine MPs leaving their parties in mid-term, Parliament 
passed the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 (NZ).67 This legislation sought to 
prevent such mid-term switches of allegiance, on the grounds that they upset the 
proportionality of representation that MMP was intended to deliver, and contributed 
to voter distrust of the political process as a whole. It worked by declaring an 
individual MP's seat to be 'vacant' — in effect sacking the representative from 
Parliament — should he or she resign from their political party; or should the party 
leader 'reasonably believe' he or she has acted in a way which 'has distorted, and is 
likely to continue to distort, the proportionality of political party representation in 
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63  Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci, 'Issues and Party Competition Under Alternative 
Electoral Systems' (2002) 8 Party Politics 123, 141. 
64  Not only has there been an increase in the number of political parties represented in 
Parliament, but the diversity of individuals sitting as MPs has also increased under MMP. 
There are proportionately more women and Maori MPs sitting in Parliament than was the 
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transsexual MPs. See generally Jeffrey Karp, 'Members of Parliament and Representation', 
in Vowles et al (eds), above n 23, 130–145. 
65  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1999, S.O. 145. 
66  Mrs Awatere-Huata was a list MP, meaning that the effect of the move simply was to 
reduce ACT's overall vote in the House from 9 to 8. A second MP — Maurice Williamson 
— also was suspended for a period from the National Party's caucus. However, the Party 
continued to cast his vote in Parliament during his suspension, and he was restored to full 
party membership in December 2003. 
67  For an account of the background to this legislation, as well as its unintended 
consequences, see Andrew Geddis, 'Gang Aft A'gley: New Zealand's Attempt to Combat 
'Party Hopping' by Elected Representatives', (2002) 1 Election Law Journal 557.  
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Parliament as determined at the last general election.'68 The practical consequence of 
this legislation is to force a dissenting MP to toe the party line, on pain of being ousted 
from Parliament should he or she consistently vote against the party's position.69 
While this legislation is set to expire on the date of New Zealand's next general election 
(expected in 2005), its implementation is indicative of the shift in perception of 
representatives under MMP from being first and foremost beholden to their individual 
constituencies, to now being representatives of the party whose label they bore at the 
previous election. 
What remains uncertain at present is the extent to which the new recognition that 
has been given to the representational role of the political parties under MMP will 
change the treatment given to those entities by the courts. As Graeme Orr has 
remarked in the Australian context,70 the statutory requirement for parties to register, 
along with the benefits provided by such registration, has proved to be a first step in 
the increased 'juridification' of the internal affairs of political parties. Certainly, the 
registration requirements, disclosure provisions, and other regulatory measures 
contained in the Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) seem to render obsolete Fisher J's observation 
that New Zealand's political parties 'have no statutory or public duties.'71 The further 
question must therefore be the extent to which the role now given to the parties under 
MMP will attract public law duties in relation to elected representatives bearing some 
party's label, prospective candidates seeking the right to wear that label, and ordinary 
members of a party. Developments in this area have been slow to emerge, but given 
the issues at stake — as well as the law's abhorrence of a vacuum — they can be 
expected. 
IV PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT UNDER MMP 
This Part considers the effect that MMP has had on New Zealand government, and in 
particular, the shifting balances of power between the different actors in the 
constitution: political parties; Parliament; the executive; and the Governor-General. 
A The balance of power under MMP 
While much was unknown and unpredictable about the change to MMP, one major 
adjustment for New Zealand's systems of party government could be foreshadowed 
with reasonable certainty. Duverger's law on the relationship between electoral 
systems and parties states that plurality systems tend to result in a two party system 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
68  Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 (NZ), s 5 (inserting a new ss 55C–55D into the 
Electoral Act 1993 (NZ). A party leader also must gain the approval of two-thirds of the 
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(as with New Zealand's Labour/National duopoly from 1936–93), while proportional 
representation systems lead to multi-party systems.72 Thus, from an early stage, MMP 
was predicted — with both delight and dismay — to bring an increase in parties 
represented in the House of Representatives, along with the demise of single-party 
majoritarian government. 
The Royal Commission reflected this orthodoxy when it opined that the 
introduction of MMP 'would be likely to increase the representation of minor parties in 
the House, and thus decrease the chances of [one] party gaining an absolute majority 
of seats.'73 However, the Commission did not undertake any detailed examination of 
the possible range of government configuration, other than to note that coalition or 
minority government was not an automatic consequence of MMP. Ireland (employing 
STV), it pointed out, had seen single-party minority governments, minority coalitions, 
and majority coalitions. Therefore, it counselled against necessarily expecting change, 
stating that New Zealand's indigenous political traditions and history of single-party 
government may well not lead to coalition government.74
The Commission's discussion, of course, took place many years before MMP was 
adopted. Once MMP had become a certainty, deliberation about government 
composition began to crystallise. In September 1995, the New Zealand Political Change 
Project (comprised of senior academic political scientists) undertook a survey of 
'opinion leaders' to uncover their views on the impact of MMP on likely government 
formations.75 For the 1996 election, only 16 percent thought that single-party majority 
government would eventuate. A further 27 percent thought that some kind of minority 
government would result, while most, 56 percent, considered that majority coalition 
government was the most likely outcome. In the long term, 76 percent of opinion 
leaders thought that the electorate's cultural preference for majority governments 
meant such coalitions would become the new norm. Interestingly, these views went 
against both international experience and academic writings, which indicate that 
Westminster systems accustomed to single-party majority government such as New 
Zealand settle into a pattern of minority government when changing to a 
proportionality based electoral system.76
Given that majority coalition government was widely expected by the political elite 
(and presumably preferred by voters) as a short and long term consequence of MMP, 
what constitutional and political factors might be thought to affect the behaviour of 
parties in forming governments? 
The New Zealand constitutional framework for forming a government under MMP 
(or indeed previously) can be characterised by its extreme simplicity. The Electoral Act 
1993 (NZ) provides no guidance: rather, the matter primarily is governed by 
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72  Duverger, above n 20, 239. 
73  RCES, above n 7, 57. 
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75  Opinion leaders were defined as, inter alia, political party executives, chief executives of 
public service ministries and departments, trade union leaders, education leaders, heads of 
interest groups, and MPs: see Boston et al, above n 3, 28. 
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constitutional convention.77 The minimum qualification is that a government must 
command a simple, not an absolute or qualified, majority in Parliament on any vote of 
confidence and supply. Moreover, there are no restrictions on the size, composition or 
structure of the Cabinet (which remains a creature of convention rather than statute); 
no internal party rules limiting the range of parties with which coalitions can be 
negotiated; and no formal extra-constitutional or extra-parliamentary constraints on 
coalition formation (such as a requirement to include Maori representatives or have a 
gender-balanced composition).78  
Presiding over this constitutional landscape is the figure of the Governor-General. 
As in most Westminster systems that are constitutional monarchies, as the sovereign's 
representative, the Governor-General plays a largely symbolic role in government 
formation and the conduct of government. The potential exception lies with the reserve 
powers, those powers which represent the last vestige of the Crown's original power to 
govern, and which may, in certain circumstances, be exercised without executive 
advice.79
Under FPTP, the Governor-General's exercise of the reserve power to appoint a 
Prime Minister (and thereby determine the government) was unproblematic. 
Convention dictated that the Governor-General would appoint the leader of the party 
securing a majority of seats in the House on the basis that he or she would be able to 
hold the confidence of the House. With only two parties usually represented in 
Parliament, it was generally clear which one was in the majority.80  
The introduction of MMP, with its capacity for delivering multi-party Parliaments, 
had the potential to disturb this established pattern. Where it was not clear which 
party or parties had a majority of seats, or the ability to secure the confidence of the 
House, the Governor-General would have the power to exercise independent 
judgement. This possibility caused quite some media speculation and academic 
comment prior to the first MMP election.81 Governors-General themselves are acutely 
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MMP' [1996] New Zealand Law Journal 213. 
2004 Causes and Consequences of NZ's Adoption of MMP 17 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
aware of the increased power MMP may place in their hands, as their public comments 
have made clear.82  
MMP thus had the potential to change the balance of power in New Zealand's 
constitutional arrangements, taking it out of the hands of parties, and delivering it to 
the Queen's unelected and unaccountable representative.83 However, as shall shortly 
be considered, it seems that despite the predictions of greater gubernatorial influence 
that preceded MMP (and which return at every election), the pre-MMP status quo has 
remained. Successive Governors-General have kept their distance from the processes 
of government formation, thereby affirming the intensely political nature of making 
and unmaking governments.  
Given the lack of constitutional constraints coupled with gubernatorial restraint, 
political parties have almost complete freedom to coalesce (or not) as they wish, once 
the electoral verdict is delivered. This freedom threw up a particularly startling result 
after the 1996 election. After almost two months of highly secretive multi-level 
negotiations which involved the two major parties simultaneously vying for the 
favours of the third-placed populist NZ First party, the incumbent National party went 
into coalition with NZ First, forming a majority coalition government.84  
This combination had not even been considered a remote possibility by the NZ 
Political Change Project (which listed six possible government configurations).85 It was 
widely seen as contrary to political promises and electoral expectations (the leader of 
NZ First having campaigned on the basis that a vote for NZ First was the only way to 
remove National from power).86 Therefore, it was not surprising that this marriage of 
unlikely political bedfellows proved unsustainable. The coalition (and the NZ First 
party) imploded mid-term. National remained in government by leading a minority 
administration reliant on varying degrees of support from some former members of 
NZ First, and the ACT and United parties. 
During that term, it was thought that there might be further potential for the 
Governor-General to get involved in the political process, either via the change of 
Prime Minister in December 1997, or the later coalition breakdown. Central to the 
Governor-General's actions was the issue of the confidence of the House. At various 
times during these events, the Governor-General relied on public statements from 
various political leaders indicating whether the change of leadership or government 
would affect their confidence votes. So long as confidence was assured, the Governor-
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General allowed the political events to take their course without constitutional 
intervention.87
This non-interventionist pattern was reproduced at the 1999 and 2002 elections. 
Indeed, gubernatorial activism seemed even less likely on those occasions, since the 
party (and thus the parliamentary) alliances were well-signalled during the election 
campaign, and did not take long to be formalised once the votes were in. In 1999 the 
Labour party formed a minority coalition with the Alliance (itself an umbrella party for 
four others)88 as its junior partner. The Green party agreed to support the coalition on 
matters of confidence. 
Coalition negotiations were low-key and concluded swiftly. This may have been 
out of a desire not to repeat the unpopular and unfamiliar drawn-out negotiations 
which followed the previous election,89 but is also likely to have been given a head 
start by the large degree of pre-election cooperation between Labour and the Alliance.  
Expectations of coalition discipline have evolved and become more sophisticated as 
parties become more used to the messy realities of governing together. At a page-and-
a-half, and largely devoid of policy matters, the Labour–Alliance coalition agreement 
was minimalist in comparison to the National–NZ First opus. Coalition unity was at 
first looser but better preserved than previously, with an explicit 'agree to disagree' 
clause in the coalition agreement.90
By contrast, the coalition agreement between National and NZ First was an 
extensive document which sought to tie down the parties to a wide range of policy 
positions and outcomes.91 It may have been that either of the coalition partners, 
accustomed to majority government, were in the early stages of adjustment, unwilling 
to trade the comfort of the known for a more flexible arrangement that might have left 
them reliant on shifting parliamentary alliances and vulnerable to a vote of confidence. 
Indeed, for the duration of that coalition, party discipline was very tight.92  
Despite the difference in formal expectations of unity in relation to the Labour–
Alliance coalition, government stability again proved difficult to maintain. In early 
2002, the Alliance party broke apart on the issue of whether New Zealand should send 
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troops to Afghanistan.93 In the end, the Prime Minister declared the confidence 
situation unsupportable and called an early election.94
In 2002, Labour again became the senior partner in a minority coalition, this time 
with the tiny Progressive Coalition (formed from former members of the Alliance). 
Coalition negotiations again were quickly concluded, and an agreement similar to the 
Labour–Alliance agreement signed within a few days of the election. This outcome had 
been widely signalled during the election campaign. It was thought that the 
government-in-waiting might rely on support from the Green party.95 However, 
election night revealed a sudden rise in fortunes of the centre-right United Future 
(previously United) party, moving them from one MP to eight, while a rebounding of 
support levels for NZ First saw them become the third largest party in the House with 
thirteen MPs.  
This change in electoral fortunes meant that Labour and the Progressive Coalition 
had a wider range of potential supporters. They entered into a formal confidence and 
supply agreement with the United Future party, but have at times relied on Green 
support where their proposed legislation proved too left-wing for United and/or NZ 
First.  
Interestingly, this reliance on multiple parties from different parts of the political 
spectrum to pass legislation seems to be proving more acceptable to the electorate than 
during the latter part of the 1996–99 term. It may be that the New Zealand electorate is 
becoming more comfortable with (coalition) minority government and in less need of a 
FPTP-style guarantee that the government will always get its legislation through 
without the need to consult other parties.  
New Zealand has now experienced three elections under MMP. The first resulted in 
a majority coalition government which fragmented into a minority-supported 
government, the next two, minority coalitions. The form of government has clearly 
changed, as expected. After an early and perhaps anomalous hiccup, New Zealand 
government formation seems to be falling into the patterns predicted for it, not by its 
own political actors, but by those outside New Zealand's political and constitutional 
confines.  
Within Parliament, the face of legislative power has also experienced a 
transformation. Due to the increased number of parties in the House, parliamentary 
select committees are no longer automatically headed by a member of the government 
or have a government majority. This has resulted in Parliament being able to affect the 
content of legislation at the select committee stage much more than previously. At 
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times, explicit trade-offs have been made where changes to bills acceptable to a certain 
segment of voters are made conditional on the promise of a particular party's support 
in the House.96 It has been noted that this aspect of MMP at first attracted some 
criticism from the public; with Sir John Wallace (who chaired the Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System) commenting that '[the voters] simply do not like the 
negotiatory aspects of coalition or minority government. … They prefer the more 
straight-forward or predictable attitude of one side versus the other'.97 This unease 
seems to have lessened with time. 
The transition from governing alone to sharing power has proved difficult at times 
for the two major parties, which previously could rely on three years of unimpeded 
rule; similarly, minor parties in coalition, previously consigned to opposition or 
excluded from the House altogether, have found it hard to be part of the government 
yet maintain a separate identity. Opposition parties have been able to influence the 
content of legislation more so than under FPTP, and even where not formally part of 
government, have been included in the legislative programme. 
Predictions that MMP governments would prove less effective than FPTP ones have 
not come to pass. In fact, as Sir John Wallace noted of all three MMP governments: 
'government has been remarkably effective in the sense of achieving the passage into 
legislation of election policies and promises'.98 He remarked that several government 
initiatives, particularly those from the National-led government, could quite correctly 
be characterised as 'controversial'. 
In conclusion, governments have taken a different form under MMP than many in 
New Zealand expected. However, the efficacy of government has not lessened, while 
at the same time, legislative power has been shared amongst more parties than 
previously, making for a more participatory and powerful Parliament.  
B Cabinet collective responsibility 
Once formed, how has MMP affected the formal internal conduct of government? 
Constraints on government are few in New Zealand, with discipline being imposed by 
way of the conventions of collective Cabinet responsibility, individual and vicarious 
ministerial responsibility, caucus and party sentiment, and the electoral sanction. 
The impact of MMP on the rules relating to the management of government has 
perhaps been most obvious in relation to the convention of Cabinet collective 
responsibility.99 This is an essential part of successful Westminster government. 
Cabinet, bound to unanimity over its decisions, is thereby able to present a united face 
to Parliament and thereby seek or maintain the confidence of the House.100 A Cabinet 
divided has lost its authority and is vulnerable to being replaced with an alternative 
administration. The enforcement of collective responsibility also enables the smooth 
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running of government.101 Ministers unable to support publicly Cabinet decisions are 
required to resign.  
Under FPTP Cabinet collective responsibility was relatively straightforward. 
Ministers had on occasion, resigned or been dismissed from Cabinet for being unable 
to support government decisions.102 The introduction of MMP was seen as bringing 
increased pressure to bear on this constitutional convention, due to the incentives, 
particularly for smaller parties, to differentiate themselves from their senior coalition 
partner, take credit for policy incentives they have pushed for, and disassociate 
themselves from decisions likely to be unpopular with their constituency. 
In 1996 the Cabinet Office Manual was extensively revised in preparation for the first 
MMP government. However, no changes were made to the orthodox understandings 
of Cabinet collective responsibility.103  
The National–NZ First coalition agreement did not deviate from this position, 
stating: '[t]he established conventions of collective responsibility and confidentiality 
are accepted. … It is agreed that every endeavour shall be made for decision making in 
Cabinet to be on a consensual basis.'104 As noted, the National–NZ First government 
had largely agreed its policy positions in advance and imposed a high degree of 
discipline on its MPs. It may be therefore, that this approach sought to avoid the need 
to consider the implications for collective responsibility. However, this over-planning 
may have contributed to the downfall of the National–NZ First government. When the 
coalition partners unexpectedly found themselves unable to agree, the constraints of 
collective responsibility meant that the coalition simply fell apart.  
The Labour–Alliance coalition agreement took a different approach. It recognised 
that, despite the parties having reasonably similar policy stances, on occasions they 
may find themselves in disagreement. Accordingly, the Labour–Alliance agreement 
had this to say about Cabinet collective responsibility: 
Where either party leader considers that a distinctive policy matter raises a matter of 
importance to the party's political identity, the leader will raise this with the coalition 
management committee which will resolve an appropriate course of action, including 
possibly identifying the matter as one of 'party distinction'. In this event there may be 
public differentiation between the parties in speech and vote which will not be regarded 
as being in breach of the convention.'105
The Cabinet Manual was revised to reflect this changed understanding. The 
governing principle of collective responsibility was affirmed, but changes were made 
to recognise the introduction of 'agree to disagree' clauses in coalition agreements. 
However, such clauses were the only exception to the convention recognised. The 
Labour–Progressives coalition agreement negotiated in 2002 contains an identical 
clause, although it is yet to be invoked.  
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Such 'agree to disagree' clauses are not new. They have occurred a number of times 
in UK history and are commonplace in Europe.106 Their adoption by New Zealand's 
political parties to better reflect the complexities of governing under proportional 
representation should not come as a surprise.  
Thus it may be concluded that internal government management has become more 
sophisticated under MMP. Collective Cabinet responsibility in New Zealand has 
evolved in response to the different pressures and requirements of coalition 
government, recognising the reality of different party stances and the need to 
acknowledge these to preserve government stability. 
V  MMP AND THE PEOPLE 
As noted, it has been said that the drive to adopt MMP was sourced in considerable 
disillusionment with New Zealand's political institutions and electoral processes.107 
This Part considers the impact of MMP and companion initiatives in addressing these 
voter concerns. 
A Direct democracy in the MMP era 
In the same year as New Zealand's electoral future was being decided, the Citizens 
Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (NZ) ('CIR Act') was enacted. The CIR Act provides for the 
holding of non-binding referendums, initiated by voters, and funded by the 
government.108 There are almost no restrictions on subject matter (save for election 
results).109
Some commentators have said that this measure was in part designed to appease 
voters' frustrations with FPTP governments' seeming unresponsiveness to the 
electorate once elected.110 An underlying objective may have been to minimise the 
attractiveness of MMP in the forthcoming referendum. The official word from the 
government was that the CIR Act was enacted to enhance New Zealanders' 
opportunities to engage in the democratic process.111 Accordingly, it was supposed to 
be seen as a complementary rather than competing measure to MMP. 
The early years of the Act saw proposed petition questions flooding in. However, in 
ten years, only three referendums have been held under the CIR Act's provisions.112
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
106  Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, 1998) 
198. See also Jonathan Boston, 'Forming the Coalition Between Labour and the Alliance', in 
Boston et al, above n 4, 239, 258. 
107  See Bale and Roberts, above n 18. 
108  Under the Act, voters submit potential referendum questions to the Clerk of the House. 
Upon his approval of the question, they have 12 months to garner the signatures of ten 
percent of all registered electors supporting the holding of a referendum on that question. 
If these are collected, then the referendum will proceed.  
109  Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (NZ), s 4.  
110  Mark Gobbi, The Quest for Legitimacy: A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin and 
Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1994) 225–8.  
111  New Zealand, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 March 1992, 
vol 522, 6713 (Christine Fletcher MP).  
112  In 1995, a referendum was held on the appropriate number of firefighters to be employed. 
In 1999, two questions were asked in conjunction with the general election, one asking 
2004 Causes and Consequences of NZ's Adoption of MMP 23 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Several reasons have been posited for this phenomenon. It seems unlikely that 
voters are so satisfied with MMP as a means of expressing their opinion to politicians 
that they no longer wish to speak with a direct voice. Rather, the Act contains several 
internal constraints that inhibit its attractiveness to potential users.113 However, most 
likely the greatest obstacle to public confidence in (and thus use of) the CIR Act is its 
non-binding character. On the three occasions that referendums have been held, the 
verdict has been overwhelming (over 80 percent in each case). Yet in two cases, the 
government declined to act on the result,114 and in the third, the response has been 
lukewarm.115
The CIR Act fulfils the warning of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System. 
While it acknowledged the benefits of referendums in legitimising democratic 
government, extending popular participation, and providing a restraint on 
government, the Commission cautioned against the use of referendums to solve 
complex policy issues and concluded that '[i]n general, initiatives and referenda are 
blunt and crude devices which need to be used with care and circumspection.'116  
The CIR Act has proved itself to be such a 'blunt and crude' measure, engendering 
considerable citizen dissatisfaction with it.117 It has not contributed to higher feelings 
of civic engagement or trust in government,118 and has possibly increased voter 
cynicism in government responsiveness.  
However, it is unlikely that MMP will be able to salve the wounds of increasing 
civic alienation. This is a problem widespread in western democracies, and transcends 
cultures, political party configurations, political histories, and electoral systems.119  
B Participation and engagement 
In the political science literature, voter turnout at elections has been taken as a form of 
shorthand for electorate confidence in the system and its institutions.120 A high level of 
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turnout confers a certain level of legitimacy on the government and evens out political 
influence across the electorate.  
Voting is not compulsory in New Zealand. Registration is, but is not strictly 
enforced.121 Nevertheless, New Zealand has historically enjoyed high levels of turnout 
(speaking both comparatively and absolutely).122 The Royal Commission was hopeful 
that MMP might arrest and reverse the decline in turnout New Zealand was 
experiencing during the 1980s,123 and which continued during the 1990s. 
At first, their hopes seemed to have been realised. Turnout was 88.3% of registered 
voters at the 1996 election, probably reflecting the high level of interest in the new 
electoral system and increased feelings of political efficacy rather than a resurgence of 
confidence in parties or MPs.124 However, this was not sustained in 1999125 or 2002. 
Turnout at those elections fell to 83.1 percent and 77 percent, respectively. Turnout in 
the Maori electorates in 2002 fell to between 54 and 60 percent.126 This steady decline 
in turnout goes against collective wisdom, which posits that a change to proportional 
representation usually boosts turnout by five to ten percent.127  
This has caused some concern amongst MPs, with Parliament's Justice and Electoral 
select committee turning its mind to this problem in its recent reports. The theme 
underpinning the Committee's discussions is that the decline in turnout is sourced in 
various barriers to voting, rather than a verdict on the electoral system. Accordingly, 
the Committee has recommended a number of initiatives to reduce barriers to voting. 
These include a consideration of various forms of electronic voting (phone voting, use 
of the internet), an increase in publicity campaigns, and accommodations to encourage 
Maori to vote. Whether any of these initiatives are implemented or have the desired 
effect remains to be seen. 
In addition to declining participation, voters have continued to send mixed 
messages about their support for MMP in recent years. The MMP Review Committee, 
a parliamentary select committee established in 2000 to consider various aspects of 
MMP, undertook a survey to establish voter attitudes to MMP. That survey revealed 
that voters were able to make fairly sophisticated assessments of MMP: they 
appreciated its ability to increase the diversity of representatives in the House, but 
were less appreciative of its impact on government stability. MMP was rated a success 
for its impact on increasing consensus and consultation in politics;128 it was branded 
unsuccessful in making 'MPs listen to voters more, making it harder for parties to 
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break their election promises, providing stable government, fostering a sense of 
national unity or ensuring sound economic policies'.129 A majority of submitters to the 
MMP Review Committee wanted to retain MMP by a ratio of 2:1.130 The survey of the 
public revealed that 47 percent of voters wished to revert to FPTP; over 40 percent 
would retain MMP, although that percentage would increase to 47 if MMP were 
modified.131  
These final figures reflect the public's somewhat unsettled attitude towards the 
MMP voting system in practice. It is clear that many voters at the 1993 referendum had 
unrealistic expectations of the potential impact of MMP on MPs' behaviour, thinking 
that MMP would result in a consensual political utopia and grand all-party coalition 
government.132 As noted earlier, nothing of the sort eventuated, leaving some who had 
voted for MMP disappointed.133 Bolstering the thesis that support levels for MMP are 
directly related to voters' views on the behaviour of MPs and parties, support for MMP 
fell to less than 50 percent after the National–NZ First coalition was established,134 and 
a number of calls for the reinstatement of FPTP were made. MMP's stock with the 
public reached its low point of 35 percent in July 1998135 — the period just before the 
National–NZ First coalition broke down — and remained feeble going into the 1999 
election, as voters were wary of being hoodwinked by parties saying one thing and 
doing another.  
In addition, the overwhelming Citizens Initiated Referenda vote in favour of 
reducing the number of MPs from 120 to 99 that year was also widely interpreted as a 
condemnation of MPs' behaviour rather than a verdict on MMP per se. For many 
voters, the early experience of MMP was that far from improving the behaviour of 
MPs, as the public had wished,136 or the behaviour of parties, as the Royal 
Commission had hoped, the new voting system appeared to create new incentives for 
poor political behaviour.137 In a multi-party system, there is a greater need to 
differentiate one's party from the others and raise its profile, but there has not been a 
corresponding increase in the number of opportunities and outlets to do so. Therefore, 
party politics may well have become more adversarial under MMP rather than less. 
This goes against a major pre-MMP electorate expectation that MMP would somehow 
lead to a consensual grand coalition, devoid of partisan adversarialism. More 
experienced MPs (who remain the majority of members), already adept at the political 
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game, may have adapted better to the multi-party environment than MPs from parties 
previously denied representation. Reinforcing this, the MMP Review Committee 
undertook its own research on the question, and concluded that the worst-behaved 
MPs138 were the more established MPs, elected under FPTP. 139  
However, since the initial unexpected outcomes at the 1996–99 term, support for 
MMP has gradually risen. After the 2002 election, support for MMP rose to 54.2 
percent over FPTP's 30.3 percent, but turnout in that contest had again declined.140 If, 
as the MMP Review Committee noted, 'judgements on MMP are inextricably linked 
with the level of general satisfaction with politics and politicians'141 then the 
anticipated ability of MMP to encourage New Zealanders to engage with the political 
system may well have been overstated. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Our intention here has been neither to praise nor bury MMP, but rather to reflect upon 
the impact that the new voting system has had upon different aspects of New 
Zealand's public and political life, as well as to trace some of the responses of New 
Zealand's legal ordering to these new developments. In this final section, we try and 
draw some of these diverse individual insights together into a couple of broader, more 
generalised lessons that may be taken from New Zealand's experience with electoral 
reform. 
The first lesson is the danger involved in over-emphasising the likely benefits that 
will be gained by altering the electoral process. This risk stems from the process 
required to achieve change in this field. In order to overcome institutional inertia with 
respect to electoral reform — incumbent political actors who have achieved success 
under the existing rules will have a vested interest in retaining them — often it will be 
politically necessary to present a vision of 'better things' to which the voting public can 
aspire. However, raising expectations about the consequence of some particular 
amendment to the way in which a society's electoral politics are regulated can breed 
disillusionment if the promised outcome does not appear.  
A constant theme in New Zealand's experiments in electoral reform has been the 
role of the people as participators in government. MMP was expected to bring about a 
change in political responsiveness. However, politics remains an adversarial 
enterprise: the bounds of inter-party co-operation at the government and 
parliamentary level are carefully delimited, and arguably, governments still feel able to 
engage in electorally-unpopular activities just as they did under FPTP. Citizen 
participation in elections was also expected to rise on the back of a swell of feelings of 
voter efficacy. Yet voter turnout continues to decline under MMP, thus perhaps 
pointing to a greater malaise that MMP alone cannot cure. Other mechanisms for 
granting the people some voice in government, such as the CIR Act, have also failed to 
deliver on expectations. 
Arguably, many of those who advocated switching to MMP fell into the trap of 
over-expectation in the lead-up to the 1993 referendum. Changing the voting system 
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was predicted to be a panacea for a host of political ills, ranging from inequalities in 
the spread of representation, through to society's general lack of trust in politicians. In 
particular, when describing the likely effect of MMP upon the behaviour of individual 
political actors, proponents of reform seemed to forget James Madison's timeless 
insight: 'If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary.'142 Consequently, when perceived self-serving political behaviour 
reasserted itself during the first MMP parliament of 1996–99, a large segment of the 
public felt misled. This belief may then have exacerbated the widespread distrust of 
political actors and institutions that MMP was supposed to cure.  
Following on from this first insight, a second lesson might be grandly termed 'issue 
displacement and the ubiquity of the regulatory instinct'; or, less extravagantly, 
'unintended consequences and the perceived need for ongoing reform'. This insight is 
by no means unique to the field of electoral management: it arises any time that 
attempts are made to apply legal controls to a particular area of social life. Simply put, 
the adoption of some reform measure will often fail to resolve the problem that 
sparked the change, but rather transmute it into a new form or pattern. The failure to 
finally lay the issue to rest can then lead to further reform measures being put in place, 
which in turn may only displace the original problem to a new site. Therefore, electoral 
reform may be best viewed less as an exercise in resolving problems once and for all, 
and more as a way of trying to give them a less objectionable appearance. 
In the New Zealand context, this lesson is illustrated by the way in which 
regulatory attention has come to be directed towards the political parties following the 
introduction of MMP. On the one hand, the change to a system of proportional 
representation based upon the Party Vote was intended to more closely align the 
distribution of parliamentary representation to the expressed preferences of the voting 
public. However, in doing so the voting system now acknowledges that seats in 
Parliament are the 'property' of the political parties qua parties. Consequently, the 
problem of representation re-emerged in two different forms following the adoption of 
MMP. First of all, the issue of 'party hopping' MPs — representatives who abandon the 
party under whose banner they were elected in order to sit in Parliament under a 
different guise — rose to the fore. And secondly, through questions about the internal 
democracy of the parties as institutions, and the ability of the party leadership to 
control the selection of candidates.  
The advent of these concerns has resulted in the expansion of legal regulation of the 
behaviour of individual MPs,143 as well as the internal workings of the political 
parties.144 However, these regulatory moves simply raise further questions with 
regards to the issue of 'representation'. Does giving the leadership of a political party 
(with caucus approval) the power to expel rebel MPs from Parliament diminish the 
freedom of conscience of the individual representative to such an extent that they 
effectively can no longer oppose the leadership in the name of those who voted for the 
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party?145 Will the increasing 'juridification' of internal party issues move political 
disputes into a forum in which only certain party members — those with the resources 
to fund court action — can participate? These remain live issues in the New Zealand 
context, and as such, the 'problem' of representation under MMP remains one which is 
unresolved. 
It would be a mistake to assume from the forgoing that we advocate some sort of 
Popperian conclusion that all reform should take the form of 'piecemeal social 
engineering',146 or even a position that all electoral reform is ultimately futile. For what 
it is worth, both authors support the wholesale adoption of MMP in place of the 
previous FPTP system, and have argued elsewhere in favour of particular electoral 
reform proposals.147 However, we would argue for a certain modesty of ambition 
when approaching the issue. Inevitably, there will be limits to what can be achieved by 
using legal means to change a society's electoral processes, given that such moves are a 
process based response to what are often substantive problems. Simply put, some 
issues — declining turnout rates at elections, for instance, or the capacity of 
representatives to deliver on election promises — have their roots in fields which the 
law can touch but obliquely. What we would argue is that it is better to recognise these 
limits in advance, and candidly acknowledge their existence, than to see all questions 
of electoral change as amenable to an immediate legal response.  
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